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Abstract : 
 
Presenting the best financial structure of the firm, Hunt (1961) introduces the 
concept of trade on equity where the call for loans pushes the profit ratio of 
stockholders’capital. This principle is obviously an accounting view of the 
profit ratio but its relevance constitutes only an hypothesis in dynamics. We 
have carried out the first (to our knowledge) simulations of firm model to 
analyse its validity in dynamics. 
On the other hand, in our model, the distribution of dividend begins when the 
mass of profit exceeds a particular threshold chosen by the managers. Before 
this level, the braking of the profits withdrawal outside the firm drives a 
better self-financing. On the contrary, beyond the threshold, shared profits are 
not reinvested and the size of the firm (and its capital) may be reduced when 
the stockholders expect the downward side of the life cycle of the activity. 
In this paper, we discuss and simulate a system of three ordinary differential 
equations gathering the variables of profits, reinvestments and financial flow 
of borrowings. 
We investigate the implications of a greater running into debt associated with 
a more cautious policy of dividend distribution. With a nonlinear relation of 
reinvestments, the two connected policies exhibit the ability of the debt to 
inject perturbation into the profit motion. Indeed, the results display various 
periodicities and chaos. Nonetheless, a suplementary debt may amplify the 
level of probable losses. The same implication is observed when the dividend 
policy is more and more cautious. The 3D model shows a wide range of a 
dynamic behavior that may be trapped into chaotic attractors with strange 
characteristics. 
 
JEL Classification : C 61, C 62, G 32. 
Key words : Corporate debt, Dividend Policy, Nonlinearity, Strange attractor 
 
1 
 « Static and dynamic[...] are not two chapters belonging 
to the same theoretical corpus but represent two  
corpuses which are utterly different.» 
 
J. Schumpeter 
 
 
I-Introduction 
 
Many managers recommand the introduction of some borrowing proportion 
in order to reach the optimal financial structure of the firm [Myers, 1977]. The 
forerunner of the Trade on Equity principle was Hunt (1961) who showed that 
the rate of profitability of the shareholders’ capital is all the more higher than 
entreprise finances its activities with debts. The success of this financial 
strategy is achieved when the profit ratio on total capitalization is greater than 
the interest rate of debt refunds [Myers, 1974 ; Glais, 1992]. 
Ceteris paribus, this massive borrowing will improve the profitability rate of 
the shares making up the shareholders’ capital. Thus, the managers can dope 
the value of the firm in the stockmarket by increasing the capital with debts. 
However, in dynamics, Hunt’s principle constitutes only an hypothesis 
because the uncertainty about the profit amounts provide to the debt flow a 
multiplying effect on the profitability rate of the shareholders’ capital. 
Having recourse to debts in this case, is a lever that acts both on the positive 
and negative side of the profitability of the entreprise. Indeed, in case of a 
sharp growth, the profitability rate is enhanced by comparison to the 
entreprise being financed only by its shareholders’ capital. 
Yet, during a recession, the losses are multiplied and the firm greatly runs 
into debts. 
On the other hand, reinforcing the financial means of a firm also goes through 
setting up a cautious policy of dividend distribution. Hence, lesser 
distribution contributes to a better profitability [Kalay, 1980]. Triggering the 
dividend distribution beyond a certain threshold of profit thereby represents 
a resource which will consolidate the finance structure of the firm [see 
Lintner, 1956; Fama and French, 1998, Fluck, 1999]. 
If this minimum level of profit is not accomplished, the shareholders’  
contribution  is called to increase the capital of their firm. 
The focus of this paper is to measure the profit trend when an entreprise 
chooses a gradual increase of its debt in relation to its capital so as to improve 
its profitability rate. In our model, the firm will also implement a cautious 
dividend policy based not on the rate, but the mass of profit itself as it will be 
able to boost its shareholders’ capital. 
 
II. The model of the firm 
 
Written in three first-order differential equations, our simplest and idealized 
model explores the firm’s dynamics with basic questions of corporate 
financial policies of the firm. 
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 Based on the first principles and rules of the best finance governance, our ab 
initio model provides a consistent dynamic exploration and experimentation 
which can serve to check the validy of these rules when a nonlinear system is 
chosen. 
The theoretical approach which governs this work links reinvestment and 
dividend policies. To improve the analysis of these two connected policies, we 
built a 3D system that goes to the heart of which dynamic behavior of the 
profit arises in a finite number of numerical simulations. 
 
II-1. Model equations 
 
 In our 3D model of autonomous O.D.Es in which dt represents the year, all 
the variables are endogenous.   
The capital of the firm is obviously at the origin of profit creation. It is made 
up of reinvestments R and financed by debts F. 
Therefore, the 1/v coeficient represents the rate of profit:  
 
dP/dt = (R + F)/v   [1] 
 
Moreover, the reinvestments are composed of a fraction of profits according 
the proportion m and of the capitalization of these very reinvestments that are 
reassessed yearly at rate n. 
 
dR/dt = m P + n ( 1 – P² )R  [2] 
 
Nevertheless, the distribution policy of the dividend interferes in this relation 
since the profit reaches exactly value 1, the nonlinear item becomes null and 
the yearly reinvestments shall remain at a constant trend m. In this figure 
case, the remainder of profits as well as the capital added value are 
distributed as dividends. 
Yet, so long as the profit doesn’t reach the unity threshold, the firm selects a 
cautious behavior to sustain its self-financing. The profits will be re-injected 
into the financing circuit of the firm. In fact, not only is the dividend 
distribution blocked, but also the capitalization increases at a rate more 
proportional than the gap separating 1 and P. 
At such a stage, when the entreprise intends to achieve a faster increase by 
self-financing, there is a call for shareholders to contribute to a capital 
increase. 
On  the contrary, beyond the profit threshold ( P > 1), the capitalization  is 
reduced by a great movement of dividend distribution. 
For higher profit amounts, not only do reinvestments shrink, but also a 
reduction in shareholders’ capital can be made. 
The shareholders will therefore avoid the fall in the exchange rate of the 
stockmarket because these high profits herald a near decline in this activity 
and a tough competition that shall occur following the emergence of new 
firms. 
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 They stop auto-financing and withdraw their funds as their firm’s technology 
has become obsolete. 
In the model, only the shared profits in this second equation follow a 
nonlinear mathematical specification. 
Eventually, according to Hunt’s hypothesis, the firm chooses an increase of its 
capital by borrowing according to the debt rate s proportional to self-
financing. 
 
dF/dt = - r P + s R  [3] 
 
The net capital inflow is obtained by deducting the refunding of the 
borrowals according to interest rate r to the profit amount. 
We carried out the first (to our knowledge) simulations of O.D.Es model of 
firm to analyse the validity of Hunt’s hypothesis when the dividend policy 
does not entail great expenses. 
To identify the outcome of our model, the numerical results are computed 
with the fifth-order Runge-Kutta integration method and accuracy (or the unit 
of time) equal to 10-6. When not indicated, the simulations are started with 
initial conditions (P, R, F) = (0.01, 0.01, 0.01). 
 
II-2. Computational results 
 
For the first simulation, we choose the set of parameters P0 (v, m, n, r, s) = (4, 
0.04, 0.02, 0.1, 0.2). The behavior of the state variables is a periodic motion 
(Fig. 1) wherein the orbits are centered around the unstable equilibrium (P, R, 
F) = (2.23, 1.11, -1.11). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Period-4 solution for P0. 
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If the firm chooses to gear up its debts (s = 0.3) to boost its activity, thereby 
improving the profit rate, it will undergo a chaotic dynamic (Fig. 2) of its 
variables, but this turbulence is contained in a field equivalent to the previous 
case (see Appendix). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Chaotic attractor for P0 when s = 0.3. 
 
Nonetheless, the intensification of this borrowal policy broadens the loss 
amplitude very acutely without reduction of the instability in the financial 
system of the firm. As a matter of fact, there is  a hazardous chaotic expansion  
as shown in figure 3 with sur-critiques Hopf bifurcations. 
  
 
Fig. 3. bifurcation diagram of profit ( s stepsize 10- 5). The borrowings implies the 
amplification of loss level 
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Beyond s = 0.4, the maximum level of losses reaches that of profits. For 
instance, at s = 0.6 an antisymmetric attractor (Fig. 4) occurs with an 
impressive decapitalization behavior ( negative values of R).  
 
 
Fig. 4. Chaotic attractor for P0 when s = 0.6. 
 
These capital withdrawls accompanying the highest level of losses, represent 
a  logical conjunction since the shareholders want to regain their funds at a 
rate higher than the losses. Worse is sR term which represents the borrowals 
and no longer finances the firm, but constitutes a capital flight. 
To avoid the risks incurred by this borrowing policy, the entreprise can opt 
for a financial management which keeps the borrowals rate constant, for 
example s=0.3, but that curbs the dividend distribution. Thus, the minimum 
threshold that triggers the distribution will undergo a continous rise creating 
financial reserves for reinvestments. 
With the new equation, where dT/dt = 10-5 is the threshold trend: 
 
dR/dt = m P + n ( T – P² )R [2.1] 
 
and T0 = 1, the dividend distribution is more and more cautious. However, 
this pattern does not reduce the risk of a negative profitability despite the 
retained earnings. In the neighborhood of T = 1.5, the possible worst 
performance moves sharply from -2 to - 6 (Fig. 5). 
The fast-occuring profits are deviated outside the entreprise with accelerated 
motion in relation with the rise of the threshold. 
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Fig. 5. bifurcation diagram of profits ( T stepsize 10- 5). The cautious 
dividend policy implies the amplification of the loss level 
 
II-3. Theoretical foundations 
 
The numerical simulations contain a wealth of information and a close 
inspection of the maps reveals the nonlinear characteristics of the dynamics. 
Indeed, the model produces a strong plasticity of chaotic attractors. For 
example, for parameters P1, a new attractor occurs (Fig. 6) thouroughly 
different.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Strange attractor for P1 (v, m, n, r, s) = (1.02, 0.02, 0.3, 0.1, 10)  
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 The total results in 3D -like the Poincaré maps in 2D (Fig. 7)- leads us the 
analytical investigation of the strange characteristics of this chaos. In fact, the 
attractors in figures 2 and 4 have different morphologies while a sole 
parameter has been modified. This propriety represents the Sensitive 
Dependence on Parameter (SDP). 
 
 
 
(a) The phase portrait of Profits and Reinvestments. 
 
 
 
(b) The two-dimensional return map of Profits.  
Fig. 7. Poincaré Maps for P2 (v, m, n, r, s) = (7.69, 0.01, 0.05, 0.09, 0.13). 
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(c) The two-dimensional return map of Reinvestments. 
Fig. 7. (continue) 
 
At another level, restarting the simulation in figure 2 with antisymmetric 
initial conditions (P, R, F) = (- 0.01, - 0.01, - 0.01) yields a second attractor (Fig. 
8) displayed in an independent sub-basin. This result provides an evidence 
for the Sensitive Dependence on Initial Conditions (SDIC) of the surveyed 
system. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Two antisymmetric chaotic attractors in separated sub-basins for P0 
and s = 0.3.  
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The simultaneous presence of SDP and SDIC testifies the strange features of 
the attractors. Theoretically, a stationary version of the van der Pol’s equation 
(1926) written in 2 first-order O.D.Es [Thompson and Steward, 1986] 
constitutes the dynamic foundation of our firm model (Fig. 9). 
 
 
dP/dt = R/v  + F/v   [1] 
 
dR/dt = m P + n ( 1 – P² )R   [2] 
    
dF/dt = - r P + s R   [3] 
 
Fig. 9. The van der Pol’s equation in our system 
 
In a previous paper [Bouali, 1999], we analyzed the outcome of a retroactive 
loop (Eq. [3]) determined by the state variables of the van der Pol’s oscillator 
itself. This feedback linkage produces a new class of strange attractors. 
 
III. Managerial Paradox 
 
Corporate governance have now reached a level of sophistication far beyond 
our idealized numerical experiments. However, they are a key for a better 
understanding of the outcome of finance strategies. 
Wherein a dynamic perspective, rules and principles of finance governance 
built in static framework may lose their validity. The findings of a well 
corporate debt policy connected to a well dividend policy may lead to an 
umpredictible and hazardous motion of the profit. In our 3D system, the rise 
of the loss level is an endogenous outcome of the borrowing policy and is not 
determined by a shock of economic recession. Against the common sense, the 
profit motion is worsened by the braking of dividend distribution ! 
The management art is the ability to avoid a rigid and irreversible finance 
program tending to a similar nonlinear turbulence amplification or stall of the 
growth trend. The best decisions are therefore those which break the 
hazardous implications for the equilibria of the firm. This art is the choice -
within tools of financial management- of a set of policies which allows a 
flexible guidance of the state variables. 
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Appendix 
 
 
We introduce briefly the fundamental proprieties of the 3D system with only 
one nonlinear equation: 
 
dP/dt = (R+ F)/v   [1] 
 
dR/dt = m P + n ( 1 – P² )R   [2] 
    
dF/dt = - r P + s R   [3] 
 
Steady-state equilibria are obtained for dP/dt = dR/dt = dF/dt = 0.  
We get R = - F from Eq. [1], R = mP/n(P² - 1) from Eq. [2] and P = sR/r from 
Eq. [3]. The last two relations yielded the following equality: 
P[nrP² - nr –ms] = 0. Indeed, the three roots of P are:  
P1 = 0, P2= [(nr + ms)/nr]1/2 and P3 = -[(nr + ms)/nr]1/2. 
Let [(nr + ms)/nr]1/2 = k, the three equilibria become: E1 (P, R, F) = (0, 0, 0),  
E2(P, R, F) = ( k, rk/s, -rk/s) and E3 (P, R, F) = ( - k, - rk/s, rk/s). E2 and E3 are 
antisymmetric. 
On the other hand, the Jacobian matrix is: 
 
  0  1/v  1/v  
J (P, R, F) =    m – 2nPR n(1 – P²) 0 
  - r  s  0 
 
Hence, we obtain |J| = [nr(1 – P²) + ms - 2nPRs]/v 
For all P (v, m, n, r, s) = (4, 0.04, 0.02, 0.1, s), E1 is unstable since |J|> 0 for any 
(positive) value of s parameter.  
The two other equilibria, for instance for s = 0.3, are E2 = (2.64, 0.88, - 0.88) and 
E3 = (- 2.64, - 0.88, 0.88). In fact, this s value characterizes two antisymmetric 
strange attractors. Indeed, two eigenvalues are complex and one is real. 
Eventually, the model is conservative for the trajectories that are close to E1 
and dissipative for the peripheral orbits (|P|> 1), particularly at the 
neighborhood of E2 and E3; then, the contraction of the volumes by unit time 
is  exp.0.02(1 – P²). 
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